Everything I've read today so far screams JIMMY CARTER YEARS. Gas prices skyrocket, even as the economy tanks. Jummy Obama tells Benjamin Netanyahu
that he'll wait till year's end to see if his pretty-pleasing
causes Iran to give up the nukes. (Not for the first time, I have
this Team America
clip running through my head.) By the end of Carter's term, our
military was in such bad shape that we couldn't relieve patrolling
carriers without transferring the aircraft - there weren't enough for
two! Here's the talk at the O Club this morning. Yes, I'm
drinking at 7 AM!
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3dc From Galrahn:
The Navy estimates it will need a total of $163 million to repair the
cruiser Port Royal, which ran aground Feb. 5, as well as the attack
submarine Hartford and the amphibious transport dock New Orleans, which
collided March 20 in the Strait of Hormuz.
But the Senate Appropriations Committee plans to fund only $155
million in ship maintenance in the supplemental. The Navy would need a
total of about $580 million to erase its current maintenance deficit of
$417 million and pay for the repairs to its three damaged ships.
The math suggests the Navy is in the red $163 million last year on
maintenance costs. I think the Navy has a serious problem, and I think
it is time to ask tough questions.
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OldSpook 3dc,
I posted something here a while back that said preventative Maint had
become a critical issue for the Navy, and if I remember correctly,
Pappy said that was his observation as well.
Our navy is becoming the old Soviet Navy - good ships but allowed to rust and fall apart thru crappy main funding and execution. |
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Pappy Let's try again:
1. Little littoral/coastal experience.
2. Little or no close-together operations.
3. High-tempo deep-water ops with few or no port visits.
4. Deferred maintenance
5. No sense of 'ownership' by crews.
6. Over-reliance on technology.
7. Reduced crews.
8. Multi-missioning ships but not providing support.
9. A Navy Command based on a business-model rather than a warrior-model.
10. Low morale in the Surface Warrior community.
11. Pressure to purple-suit (joint command) over learning one's trade.
12. Pressure to place demographics as a higher priority when selecting for command and promotion.
13. Pressure to be 'degreed' rather than knowing one's trade.
14 Pressure to be a manager rather than a leader.
15. Uncertainty for both enlisted and officer careers, especially in Reserves.
16. Navy Command in a state of flux; no clear, consistent leadership.
17. Procurement and acquisition.
18. Congress' traditional inconsistency and meddling with regards to funding, procurement and acquisition.
19. The current war.
20. No clear direction and support from National Command Authority. |
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If this history keeps repeating itself, the big question will be, "who's the Ronald Reagan to save us this time?"
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